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Chapter 5
Cornell Confronts the End of
Mandatory Retirement
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Michael W. Matier,
and David Fontanella
As a major research university, Cornell University was cognizant of predic-
tions that the ending ofmandatory retirement in 1994might affect its faculty
since this type of university has faculty members often so tied to their work
that they cannot conceive of leaving their positions unless compelled to do
so (National Research Council 1991; Rees and Smith 1991). Consequently,
Cornell’s faculty and administrators worried about what the change in the
law would might for the institution.
Cornell is unique amongmajorAmerican research institutions, in that it is
a hybrid of private and publicly assisted colleges. Six of the colleges located
on its Ithaca, New York, campus (the Colleges of Art and Sciences, Engi-
neering, Law,Management,Hotel, andArt, Architecture, and Planning) are
private colleges that charge tuitions comparable to those of other selective
private institutions. Faculty in these six colleges, referred to as the endowed
colleges, participate in a defined contribution retirement program. The
other four colleges on the Ithaca campus (Agriculture and Life Sciences,
Human Ecology,Veterinary Medicine, and Industrial and Labor Relations)
are operated by Cornell under contract with the State of New York and, in
exchange for state assistance, charge tuitions considerably lower than those
charged in the endowed colleges.These statutory colleges are integral parts
of Cornell, but many of their benefit programs are part of the benefit pro-
grams provided to the State University of New York (SUNY) campuses by
the State of New York. As such, faculty members in the statutory colleges
have a choice of participating in a state-defined benefit retirement program
or an optional defined contribution program. Over time, most new faculty
have elected to participate in the defined contribution program and there
are currently less than twenty faculty in the statutory colleges who belong
to the defined benefit system.1
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82 Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Michael W. Matier, and David Fontanella
Table 1. New Tenure-Track Appointments, Total University, 1982–83
Through 1997–98
Full Associate Assistant
Year professor professor professor Instructor Total
1982–83 15 15 50 2 82
1983–84 5 3 54 0 62
1984–85 11 9 51 0 71
1985–86 7 13 53 0 73
1986–87 15 9 75 0 99
1987–88 20 8 79 1 108
1988–89 10 23 69 0 102
1989–90 6 15 43 0 64
1990–91 11 12 48 2 73
1991–92 12 8 33 0 53
1992–93 10 11 38 2 61
1993–94 4 6 29 1 40
1994–95 9 7 44 0 60
1995–96 6 6 36 0 48
1996–97 8 9 33 1 51
1997–98* 10 8 46 1 65
Source: Authors’ calculations from Cornell University Academic Personnel Database.
Faculty (including acting) and instructors are eligible for tenure-track appointment. Health
Services, ROTC, and Medical College excluded from this table.
*As of March 24, 1998.
In July 1995, the first author of this paper was appointed vice president of
academic programs, planning and budgeting at Cornell and, at his initiative,
a joint faculty-administrative committee was subsequently established, with
him as chair, to look into how the university should respond to the elimina-
tion of mandatory retirement. In this chapter, we discuss the environment
in which the university found itself when the committee was established, the
recommendations of the committee, faculty reactions to the recommenda-
tions, and the actions that the university ultimately decided to pursue.
The Environment at Cornell
In the fall of 1996 when this committee was first established, changes in the
age distribution of theCornell faculty and changes in the economic environ-
ment in which both the statutory and endowed colleges operate, had come
together to drastically restrict the flow of new faculty into the university.
As Table 1 indicates, the total number of new tenure-track faculty appoint-
ments in the university peaked at 108 in 1987–88 and had fallen to only 48
in 1995–96. The comparable numbers for the endowed and statutory col-
leges during the same period, respectively, were 56 to 29 and 52 to 19. Put
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Cornell Confronts the End of Mandatory Retirement 83
Table 2. New Tenure-Track Appointments, Total University, 1982–83
Through 1997–98
Year Assistant professors Total Percent assistant
1982–83 50 82 61.0
1983–84 54 62 87.1
1984–85 51 71 71.8
1985–86 53 73 72.6
1986–87 75 99 75.8
1987–88 79 108 73.1
1988–89 69 102 67.6
1989–90 43 64 67.2
1990–91 48 73 65.8
1991–92 33 53 62.3
1992–93 38 61 62.3
1993–94 29 40 72.5
1994–95 44 60 73.3
1995–96 36 48 75.0
1996–97 33 51 64.7
1997–98* 46 65 70.8
Source: Authors’ calculations from Cornell University Academic Personnel Database.
Faculty (including acting) and instructors are eligible for tenure-track appointment. Health
Services, ROTC, and Medical College excluded from this table.
*As of March 24, 1998.
another way, in the aggregate, new faculty hires at Cornell fell by almost 60
percent during the period.2
Fewer new hires meant that fewer faculty with new ideas and new perspec-
tives were coming to the university. Fewer new hires also meant a reduced
ability for Cornell to diversify its faculty along gender, racial, and ethnic
lines. Finally, fewer newhires had the potential to limit Cornell’s ability to re-
main at the frontier in rapidly changing fields and to shift faculty resources
into new and exciting areas of inquiry.
Historically, Cornell has concentrated its faculty hiring at the assistant
professor level, provided good opportunities for these new assistant profes-
sors to flourish and to receive tenure, and thus grown its own ‘‘stars.’’ This
strategy is designed to build a faculty who are committed to the institution,
as well as to their owndisciplines, andwho arewilling to devote time to doing
things that benefit the institution as well as themselves personally. AsTable 2
indicates, the strategy of hiring primarily at the assistant professor level has
continued in recent years. Over the last fifteen years, approximately 70 per-
cent of all new faculty hires university-wide came at the assistant professor
level.
In spite of this emphasis on new young faculty, the decline in the over-
all number of new hires led to a decline in the number of younger faculty
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84 Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Michael W. Matier, and David Fontanella
Table 3. Distribution of Faculty by Age Group, Total University, 1982–83
To 1997–98
Year Less than 35 35–49 50–59 60 and older
1982–83 15.2 45.0 25.3 14.5
1983–84 14.5 45.8 25.8 13.9
1984–85 13.1 47.1 25.6 14.1
1985–86 12.8 48.2 24.3 14.6
1986–87 12.2 49.0 24.3 14.5
1987–88 11.8 49.8 23.6 14.8
1988–89 10.3 51.3 23.3 15.0
1989–90 9.5 51.7 23.5 15.3
1990–91 8.8 51.3 24.3 15.6
1991–92 7.6 50.9 24.4 17.1
1992–93 6.3 50.7 25.7 17.3
1993–94 5.4 50.0 26.2 18.5
1994–95 5.1 48.3 27.8 18.7
1995–96 5.0 47.8 30.2 17.0
1996–97 5.3 44.9 32.5 17.3
1997–98 5.9 42.3 33.9 17.9
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Cornell University Academic Personnel Database (Feb-
ruary 1 each year).
Faculty include part-time and acting appointments but exclude courtesy, visiting, adjunct,
emeritus, Health Services, and ROTC appointments. Age is computed as of June 30 of the
academic year.
at Cornell. While over 15 percent of all faculty were under age 35 in 1982–
83, by 1996–97, this had fallen to around 5 percent (Table 3). The decline
in the endowed colleges was only to 7 to 8 percent, but the decline in the
statutory colleges was to 2 percent.
Interestingly, the percentage of faculty over age 60had risen from roughly
13 to 21 percent in the endowed colleges during the period. In contrast, the
percentage of faculty over age 60 in the statutory colleges was lower at the
end of the period than it was at the start of the period, primarily because of
a number of early retirement incentive programs that the State of NewYork
provided at zero cost to Cornell University during these years. As noted,
statutory faculty have the option of choosing to belong to a defined benefit
retirement program or to a defined contribution (TIAA-CREF) program.3
Because the latter option was first permitted in the late 1960s, many of the
recently retired statutory faculty were enrolled in the former program. De-
fined benefit programs can be structured in ways to provide incentives for
participants to retire and retirement incentive programs can be developed
that enhance these incentives. The retirement incentives provided under
the state defined benefit program did appear to be effective in inducing
statutory faculty to retire.4 In contrast, defined contribution programs pro-
vide only limited incentives for participants to retire and the effectiveness of
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Cornell Confronts the End of Mandatory Retirement 85
Table 4. Age of Faculty at Retirement, All Faculty, 1982–83 to 1996–97
Endowed Statutory
Year Number Mean age Median age Number Mean age Median age
1982–83 7 66.4 65.0 46 63.4 64.0
1983–84 13 66.2 66.0 7 62.6 64.0
1984–85 8 68.5 70.0 19 63.5 64.0
1985–86 11 66.9 67.0 19 64.8 66.0
1986–87 12 67.2 69.0 14 63.4 64.0
1987–88 16 65.3 66.5 25 64.1 65.0
1988–89 15 67.2 69.0 19 64.6 66.0
1989–90 15 66.3 68.0 16 65.6 65.5
1990–91 11 65.4 66.0 14 63.0 64.0
1991–92 12 68.4 70.0 23 64.4 65.0
1992–93 17 64.5 64.0 12 67.4 68.0
1993–94 11 65.7 66.0 8 65.9 65.0
1994–95 10 64.8 66.0 9 63.3 63.0
1995–96 11 66.1 67.0 42 64.9 65.0
1996–97 8 68.4 69.0 19 64.1 65.0
Source: Authors’ computations from the Cornell University Academic Personnel Database.
Age computed as of retirement date.
retirement incentive programs in inducing retirement under them, is lim-
ited by tax law. As of early 1997, only 16 of the 665 statutory faculty were
enrolled in the defined benefit retirement system.
How did the elimination of mandatory retirement at age 70 in 1994 influ-
ence the ages at which Cornell faculty retire? Table 4 summarizes the mean
and median age at retirement for faculty in the endowed and statutory sec-
tors who retired since 1982–83. There is only little evidence in these data
of increases in retirement ages after the elimination of mandatory retire-
ment.The endowedmean andmedian ages at retirement fluctuated without
any discernible trend until 1993–94, but since then have increased by about
three years. The comparable statutory numbers show virtually no change.
On average, the data suggest Cornell faculty members retire well in advance
of their seventieth birthdays so that at first glance the elimination of manda-
tory retirement seems, not to have had a large impact on their retirement
behavior.5
Means or medians can be deceiving, however. Figure 1 shows the age dis-
tribution of endowed faculty at retirement during the 1982–83 to 1996–97
period. Many faculty retired well in advance of their 70th birthdays, but ap-
proximately one third retired at age 70 or older (older could occur only
after January 1, 1994, when the law changed). Indeed, in February 1998,
there were 27 endowed faculty age 70 and above whom were still actively
employed.These represent the faculty who turned 70 after January 1, 1994,
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86 Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Michael W. Matier, and David Fontanella
Figure 1. Age of faculty at retirement endowed, 1982–83 through 1996–97. As of
February 1, 1998, there were 27 active endowed faculty age 70+. Source: Authors’
calculations from Cornell University Academic Personnel Database.
and who still had not retired as of February 1998. Similarly, Figure 2 show
that approximately 11 percent of the statutory faculty who retired over the
period did so at age 70 or older and seven faculty age 70 or older were still
active in February 1998.
Inspection of data on the annual percentage of faculty retirees who were
age 70 showed no upward trend over time. However, this masks what statis-
ticians and economists call the truncated sample problem. Here the data on
retirees ignore the people continuing in active faculty status. For example,
while the mean retirement age of the 11 endowed faculty who retired in
1995–96 was 66.1, there were also 10 endowed faculty who turned age 70
that year and remained active. Moreover, of the 21 endowed faculty who
were 70 to 73 years old in 1995–96, all 21 were still active faculty at the start
of the 1996–97 academic year. In contrast, the mean retirement age of the
42 statutory faculty who retired in 1995–96 was 64.9 and only 5 statutory
faculty turned age 70 that year and remained active.6,7
A number of the faculty who are age 70 and above remain employed
under part-time phased retirement agreements. Nonetheless, the inescap-
able conclusion is that the abolition of mandatory retirement for faculty is
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Cornell Confronts the End of Mandatory Retirement 87
Figure 2. Age of faculty at statutory retirement, 1982–83 through 1996–97. As of
February 1, 1998, there were 7 active faculty age 70+. Source: Authors’ calculations
from Cornell University Academic Personnel Database.
leading to an increase in retirement ages for endowedCornell faculty.To the
extent that faculty retire at later ages, this reduces the flow of new faculty
into the university. To take a simple numerical example, suppose a univer-
sity employs 1,750 faculty, each is initially employed at the university at age
30 and each retires at age 65. In this case, an average of 50 faculty a year
will be hired. If, however, faculty retire at age 70 instead of age 65, annual
hiring of new faculty will fall by one-seventh to about 43.
Thirty-five percent of the Cornell faculty in 1996–97 had been hired prior
to 1978, when the mandatory retirement age for faculty was raised from 65
to 70, and these faculty all began their careers at Cornell with the expecta-
tion that they would retire no later than age 65.The Cornell retirement and
benefits packages as well as the tenure system had been designed with this
retirement age in mind. Twenty-seven percent of all faculty as of 1996–97
were hired between 1978 and 1987, when the law eliminating mandatory re-
tirement for faculty was enacted (although it did not become effective until
1994). All of these faculty began employment at Cornell with the expecta-
tion that they would retire from Cornell no later than age 70.Thus, the ma-
jority of faculty at Cornell at the time our committee began its deliberations
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88 Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Michael W. Matier, and David Fontanella
had received the opportunity to remain employed for longer than they or
the university expected at their time of hire.
Most faculty nearing retirement ages at Cornell are highly productive.
Their contributions to the university are numerous, and the fact that some
now choose to retire after age 70means that the university is benefiting from
their skills for a longer number of years. These extra benefits must be bal-
anced, however, against the costs to the institution of the limitation on new
faculty hires that later faculty retirement ages induce, as well as the impact
of delayed retirements on faculty salaries.8
The Preliminary Report of the Committee
The preliminary report of the joint faculty-administration committee on the
transition of faculty to emeritus status (henceforth the ‘‘transition commit-
tee’’) was circulated to the Cornell community in April of 1997.9 The com-
mittee had been instructed to rule out the option of expensive buy-out plans
because evidence from a number of campuses suggested that such plans
are often not cost effective.10 Indeed, Table 4 and Figures 1 and 2 indicated
that the majority of Cornell faculty are currently retiring before their 70th
birthdays and hence any plan that paid people to retire before age 70 would
be paying the vast majority of faculty for doing what they would have done
without extra compensation anyway.
The committee’s first set of recommendations dealt with financial plan-
ning over the life cycle. The committee wanted financial resources not to
be a constraint for those faculty members who wished to contemplate re-
tirement at age 70 or younger. In the absence of additional resources to
increase the university’s contribution into faculty retirement plans, a cost-
efficient strategy is to provide financial planning assistance to faculty over
their life cycles to ensure that they make informed investment decisions
with respect to the assets in their retirement accounts. The committee was
also concerned that only about half of Cornell’s faculty participated in tax-
deferred supplementary retirement accounts (SRAs) and only 20 percent
contributed themaximum amount into such accounts that they were legally
permitted. Hence, the transition committee also recommended that infor-
mation should be provided to faculty on the importance of taking advan-
tage of tax-deferred savings opportunities and that faculty be fully informed
that, due to the power of compound interest, saving early in the career
would have a greater impact on wealth at retirement than savings later in
the career.
A second set of recommendations viewed retirement planning from the
perspective of the academic unit, and urged faculty to discuss with chairs
or college officials what their plans were as they approached what typically
were seen as the latter years of the faculty life cycle. The ability of an aca-
demic unit to plan for its future depends on its having a sense of when its
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Cornell Confronts the End of Mandatory Retirement 89
faculty members plan to retire, and the recruitment of replacement faculty
is often a multiyear process. These discussions should take place, of course,
in full recognition that retirement is a decision protected under federal and
state law.
Still viewing things from the perspective of academic units, the committee
felt that the abolition of mandatory retirement increased the importance of
making sure that tenure does not imply a lack of accountability. Hence it rec-
ommended that steps be taken to ensure that faculty workloads be equitably
distributed across all departmental faculty and that annual salary increases
be awarded judiciously throughout a faculty member’s life cycle to match
the individual’s productivity.
A third set of recommendations dealt with allowing faculty to ‘‘phase’’ into
retirement. The university had a long established phased retirement pro-
gram that allowed faculty in the endowed part of the university to move
to half-time appointments, typically for five years, during which time they
would receive half salary but full health benefits and full retirement system
contributions. On signing an agreement to enter into such a program, the
faculty member voluntarily agrees to give up tenure and retire at of the end
of the period.This plan dated back to a time when age 65 was themandatory
retirement age and it had be revised to conform to the new federal law. It
also needed to be extended to faculty in the statutory part of the university.11
The transition committee recommended extension of the program with
a five-year maximum term specified to the half-time appointments. In addi-
tion, it specified that after an initial period during which all faculty would
be eligible to participate in such agreements if they were at least age 55 and
had 10 years of service at the institution, eligibility for the plan should be
restricted to faculty who were below the age of 70.Themotivation for such a
restriction, which it believed to be legal under the law, is that this would pro-
vide an incentive for faculty to begin the retirement process prior to age 70.
A final, and probably the most important, set of committee recommen-
dations was to greatly enhance the status of emeritus professors so that be-
coming an emeritus professor would be seen as a natural and desirable stage
of one’s career rather than as being ‘‘put out to pasture.’’ Recommenda-
tions here included providing small research stipends ($2,000/year) for five
years, guaranteeing emeritus professors at least shared office space, allow-
ing them to maintain virtually all of the privileges of active faculty mem-
bers, increasing their use in part-time postretirement teaching, enhancing
the status of the emeritus professors’ association, and encouraging emeritus
faculty to get involved in volunteer activities on the campus and in the local
community.
Inasmuch as the university was facing tight financial circumstances, there
was the issue of where the funds for the emeritus professor research stipends
would be found.The committee suggested capping university contributions
into the defined contribution retirement plan after some point in a faculty
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90 Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Michael W. Matier, and David Fontanella
Table 5. Age of New Assistant Professor to Tenure Track, 1982–83 to 1997–98
Endowed Statutory
Year Number Mean age Median age Number Mean age Median age
1982–83 23 31.1 30.0 27 32.3 33.0
1982–84 29 31.3 29.0 25 31.0 30.0
1984–85 26 31.1 30.0 24 31.1 31.0
1985–86 28 32.7 32.0 25 33.3 33.0
1986–87 39 30.8 30.0 36 33.9 33.5
1987–88 38 31.4 31.5 41 34.0 34.0
1988–89 43 32.1 31.0 26 34.5 34.0
1989–90 34 33.7 32.5 9 34.6 31.0
1990–91 22 33.4 33.5 26 34.9 33.5
1991–92 22 33.4 33.0 11 36.5 37.0
1992–93 24 33.9 31.5 14 37.8 36.5
1993–94 17 33.8 33.0 12 37.7 36.5
1994–95 29 32.9 31.0 15 35.6 33.0
1995–96 21 33.1 31.0 15 37.2 36.0
1996–97 18 30.7 30.0 15 38.0 38.0
1997–98* 38 34.0 34.0 8 36.1 36.5
Source: Authors’ calculations from Cornell University Academic Personnel Database.
*As of March 24, 1998.
member’s career as a way of helping to free up the funds. One proposal was
to cap university contributions after 37 years. This mimics the maximum
years of service credit that faculty members can accrue under the statutory
college defined benefit plan. As Table 5 indicates, the typical assistant pro-
fessor began his or her career between the ages of 30 and 35 and the mean
age of retirement in the university for faculty has been in the range of 65
to 68. Hence, the only faculty who would see the university’s contributions
stopped would be those who started careers early at the university and/or
postponed retirement until later ages.
An alternative way of accomplishing the same objective is to effectively
convert the defined contribution retirement system into a form of defined
benefit system, as both Yale and Chicago have done. Each caps the univer-
sity’s contributions into a faculty member’s retirement account, when the
cumulative university’s contributions during the faculty member’s career
(assumed to have been invested in a conservative manner) are deemed suf-
ficient to provide the individual with an annuity equal to a specified per-
centage of the individual’s final salary. If the stock market falls, and hence
the value of the individual’s hypothetical account, university contributions
are again resumed until the required annuity is again attainable. In practice,
only a small number of faculty at either Chicago or Yale have been affected
by such provisions and they tend to be in their late 60s or 70s.
Cornell’s endowed retirement plan was established in July 1976; it pro-
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Cornell Confronts the End of Mandatory Retirement 91
vides for the university to contribute 10 percent of the faculty member’s
salary each year into the faculty member’s retirement account. At the time
the plan was adopted, faculty members were compelled to retire at age 65,
which was also the age at which full social security benefits could be re-
ceived. The presence of mandatory retirement meant that there was a de
facto cap on the total number of years of contributions that the university
would make.
The increase in the mandatory retirement age to 70 in 1978, and then
its subsequent abolition (effective January 1, 1994) meant that Cornell now
contributes to its faculty retirement plan for more years than framers of the
retirement plan originally intended.To the extent that faculty members re-
tire at later ages, retirement benefits will be higher as a percentage of final
salary than was anticipated. Of course, the age at which full social security
benefits can be received is gradually being increased and will reach age 67
within 20 years. Hence, some increase in the number of years of Cornell
contribution would be required to maintain the same level of expected re-
tirement income for faculty who retire prior to the age at which full social
security benefits can be received. However, to achieve this does not require
contributions to be made indefinitely by the university.
Faculty Responses and Cornell’s Change of Policies
The faculty response to the transition committee report was one of indig-
nation. The report’s mention of matching productivity and salary increases
over the life cycle was assumed to be a statement disparaging senior faculty
and to be ‘‘ageist.’’ The committee quickly dropped this recommendation
from its final report.
The faculty also felt that the ‘‘carrots’’ that had been proposed were too
small; Congress had made tenure truly indefinite and, from their perspec-
tive, the university had to ‘‘buy out’’ their property rights if it wanted them
to retire.While they were correct that Congress had given them a new prop-
erty right, the notion that the university in its role as an employer could
take actions to try to offset the effects of the change in the law was foreign
to many of them. Economists who evaluate the effects of changes in federal
policies such as the minimum wage often argue about what the magnitudes
of employer responses actually are; however, no economist questions the
right of employers to respond (see, for example, the recent debate on the
effects of changes in the minimum wage in Card and Krueger 1995; Neu-
mark andWascher 1995). In general, all faculty do not think like economists
and some faculty even asserted that if the university tried to pursue poli-
cies to encourage voluntary retirement it would be violating the intent of
the federal law.
Indeed, faculty response to the one remaining ‘‘stick’’ in the interim re-
port, limitations on retirement contributions, is instructive. Many saw it as
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92 Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Michael W. Matier, and David Fontanella
an attempt to cut total faculty compensation, even though it was explicit
that any money saved would be used to provide benefits for emeritus fac-
ulty. Most did not comprehend that the contribution rates chosen by uni-
versities to make to their faculty members’ retirement accounts were based
on a number of assumptions including the expected age of retirement. To
the extent that faculty are retiring later, a smaller contribution rate would
be required to fund any desired level of annuity because the annuity would
be paid out over a smaller number of years, and because savings in the ac-
count would experience compound earnings tax-free over a longer number
of years. Rather, faculty saw the contribution rate, rather than the implied
annual pension benefit, as something that was ‘‘due’’ to them. Ultimately,
given faculty perceptions that their salaries were too low, which the Cornell
administration actually agreed with, the committee backed off this proposal
in its final report.12
The administration had agreed that the faculty senate would also get a
chance to comment on the committee’s final report, and comment it did. It
argued that rather than a phased retirement program, in which one had to
agree to voluntarily relinquish tenure at the end of the period, it preferred
the option of going to part-time tenured appointments indefinitely. The
committee patiently explained to them that such appointments, while pos-
sible at any time if deans agreed, were not retirement programs. It stressed
that it believed such an option would prolong active faculty careers rather
than shortening them, and it would not aid departments in planning for re-
placements. The provost also made it clear that he did not support such an
option.
The faculty senate then urged the provost to eliminate the upper age limit
for eligibility for the phased retirement program arguing that it was dis-
criminatory and would discourage rather than encourage the use of phased
retirement.The committee did not believe that voluntary retirement incen-
tive programs that have age restrictions of the type proposed above are in
violation of the law—many institutions already have, for example, retire-
ment incentive programs in which themagnitude of the ‘‘retirement bonus’’
that a faculty member receives varies inversely with the age at retirement
and falls to zero at a specified upper age.
In fact, there was some ambiguity as to whether age-based incentives to
encourage retirement are legal. Because of this, since 1994 the college and
university community has sought legislation that would explicitly recognize
the legality of such incentive plans. A provision to accomplish this was part
of the 1998 bill to extend the Higher Education Act. In late April 1998, the
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) and House staff members
reached a compromise under which the AARP agreed to drop its opposition
to the provision (see Lederman 1998). Given that the AARP has dropped
its opposition to the provision, it was expected that it would be approved
by Congress and enacted into law as part of the Higher Education Act ex-
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tension. In October 1998, Congress did approve the bill and the president
signed it into law.
The compromise language makes clear that the legality of age-based in-
centives to encourage retirement would apply only to tenured college pro-
fessors.Typically age 70 is specified as the maximum age of eligibility under
such incentive programs, and the bill also requires that all professors over
age 70 at the time of the bill’s enactment will have six months to decide if
they wanted to take advantage of such an incentive. Finally, it requires that
any professor who turns age 70 and who was ineligible to take advantage of
such an incentive before that age because of the failure to have met a mini-
mum service requirement, will become eligible for a six month period as
soon as he or she reaches the minimum service requirement, regardless of
his or her age at that time.
Cornell’s provost issued his ‘‘Provost’s Policy Statement on the Transition
of Faculty to Emeritus Status’’ onMay 8, 1998.The university policy that was
spelled out in this statement closely followed the recommendations of the
committee. In particular, it included the phased retirement policy recom-
mended by the committee because this policy already met all of the condi-
tions required in the congressional bill. However, because the bill had yet
to be passed, and nothing in life is certain, all faculty were made eligible for
phased retirement for the first two years after the policy begins ( July 1, 1998,
in the endowed colleges at Cornell). The initial two-year open window was
chosen by the university to facilitate the transition to the new policy and to
give the legislation time to be enacted by Congress.
Postscript 2000 (Ronald Ehrenberg)
It is still too early to tell how successful Cornell’s policy will to be in helping
the university maintain an adequate flow of new faculty and a sufficient pool
of funds for salary increases for continuing faculty. The median age of en-
dowed faculty at retirement remained 66 during the 1997–98 and 1998–99
period. During that period, 26 percent of the faculty retirements took place
at age 70 or greater, andmost of the latter took place at ages over 70. Indeed
by July 1999, the number of active endowed faculty ages 70 and above had
increased to 30. Of the latter total 4 were 73, 1 was 74, and 3 were 75.
Lest one be discouraged by these numbers, there are indications that the
program is providing real benefits to Cornell’s present and retired faculty
members. For example, one of my responsibilities as an administrator was
space planning. So I negotiated for, and obtained, an office for the Cornell
Association of Professors Emeritus (CAPE). This office was needed to sym-
bolize the importance of emeritus professors to the university and to pro-
vide a work space for CAPE. The office is to be adjacent to the dean of fac-
ulty, who is an elected faculty leader, to stress the connection of the emeritus
faculty to the faculty as a whole.
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94 Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Michael W. Matier, and David Fontanella
It has been a joy for me to watch the speed with which CAPE has begun
working to help both emeritus and nonemeritus faculty.The association has
compiled a list of volunteer opportunities on and off campus and developed
information on finances and other matters that faculty need to know as they
contemplate retirement. Indeed, the emeritus professors have begun to as-
sume the role of peer retirement counselors. An emeritus professor lecture
series has even been started on campus and in a local retirement community.
In a program initiated by my wife, who is an assistant superintendent of
the Ithaca City School System, several groups of Cornell retirees (staff as
well as faculty) now serve as volunteers in our local schools. The impact of
their efforts on Ithaca’s elementary school students, and the influence of
the students on them is extraordinary. Few families have three generations
living in Ithaca, so benefits besides academic progress accrue from having
volunteers in local schools. The students serve as surrogate grandchildren
for the retirees, and the retirees as surrogate grandparents for the students.
Not every element of the new program evokes enthusiasm. For example,
although compensation for part-time teaching by emeritus faculty is negoti-
ated individually, it is usually lower than the professors would have received
on a per-course basis if they had not retired. Some faculty have threatened
to postpone retiring because they view the compensation as inadequate.
I have tried to persuade colleagues who have raised this issue with me
that they should consider their cut in salary as analogous to the gifts that
alumni make to Cornell each year. Certainly, those of us who have been for-
tunate enough to spend most of our academic lives at institutions like Cor-
nell should feel extremely lucky to have had such wonderful careers.While
many of us lack the financial wealth that the university’s alumni often have,
we do have extraordinary amounts of human capital. Our time as emeritus
professors gives us an opportunity to donate that capital to the university,
whether it be in the form of advising graduate students, teaching, serving on
committees, or continuing our research.The reduced payments that emeri-
tus professors get for teaching do not seem ‘‘out of line’’ when viewed in this
way.
Perhaps Cornell’s situation is somewhat unique. Its faculty members, like
their peers at other research universities, are motivated mainly by the love
of what they do, not by money. In addition, Cornell represents the type of
institution to which faculty members can easily become attached. Its loca-
tion in a small community in which faculty can easily walk or drive to cam-
pus made it possible and important for us to design a mutually beneficial
program that enables emeritus professors to remain vigorous parts of the
community.
A successful program must offer retiring professors an opportunity to
continue to do what they love. Thus the effectiveness of Cornell’s response
to the end of mandatory retirement will depend on whether the institution
shows that it truly values emeritus professors and creates an environment in
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Cornell Confronts the End of Mandatory Retirement 95
which they can remain professionally active.Whether Cornell’s policies can
be applied to other institutions is unclear. An institution that differs from
Cornell in having many faculty members who are not as eager to continue
their research, as satisfied with their relationship with the institution, or as
interested in continuing to reside near it may need to stress different things
than we did.
Appendix A. Defined Benefit and Defined
Contribution Retirement Plans
A defined benefit retirement plan provides a retiree with an annual retirement
benefit that is specified to be a function of the individual’s salary and years
of service. A simple form of defined benefit plan is
(1) B = kts,
where B is the individual’s annual retirement benefit, k is a measure of the
generosity of the plan, t is the individual’s years of service, and s is the indi-
vidual’s average salary over some specified period of time. Under the de-
fined benefit retirement plan in effect for statutory college faculty at Cor-
nell, k is 0.02 and s is the average of the individual’s three highest annual
salaries. Hence, a statutory faculty member who retired after 30 years of ser-
vice would receive an annual pension equal to 60 percent of the average of
his or her three highest years of salary.
Defined benefit plans provide incentives for retirement because the later
one retires, the smaller the number of years that the retirement benefit pay-
ments will be made. Ignoring issues relating to salary increases, after some
age, the increase in the annual benefit level the faculty member would get
from working one more year is more than offset by the loss of one year’s
retirement benefits from delaying retirement. Thus, after some age, failing
to retire reduces the individual’s lifetime value of retirement benefits. In
addition, maximum percentage benefit levels can be specified that, after
some point, eliminate the increase in annual retirement benefits that comes
from working one more year. For example, the maximum benefit percent-
age under the statutory defined benefit plan is 75 percent of salary, which
means that once the faculty member reaches 37.5 years of service, working
additional years does not increase his or her annual retirement benefit level.
Retirement incentive programs canbe straightforwardly developedwithin
definedbenefit systems. For example, several retirement incentive programs
in Cornell’s statutory colleges provided a faculty member with an additional
month’s service credit for each year worked, if the individual retired within a
prescribed period of time.Hence, facultymembers who had been employed
for 24 years received an additional two years of credit. For an individual with
an ‘‘average salary’’ of $80,000, this would lead to an increase in annual re-
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96 Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Michael W. Matier, and David Fontanella
tirement benefits of $3,200 a year ((.02)(2)$80,000). If the faculty member
turned down the retirement incentive, in the absence of salary increases, the
faculty member would have to work two more years before he or she could
receive the same annual retirement benefit, which he or she would then col-
lect for two fewer years. Thus, the programs provided a strong incentive to
retiree.
Under defined contribution retirement systems, the employer contributes a
specified percentage of the employee’s salary each year to a fund, which is
then invested to provide benefits at retirement for the employee. The fund
‘‘belongs’’ to the employee so that as long as the market return on the assets
in the fund are positive, the value of the fund is larger the later the age at
which an employee retires. Pure defined contribution plans thus do not pro-
vide strong economic incentives to retire for faculty members, because de-
laying retirement leaves the faculty member with a larger retirement fund.
Retirement incentive programs under defined contribution systems typi-
cally provide for additional employer payments to the employee if the em-
ployee retires within a prescribed interval of time. These additional pay-
ments are subject to federal and state income taxes, however, in the year
they are made.The retirement incentive programs for statutory college fac-
ulty provided for an additional payment of 0.15 of one month’s salary for
each year of service.13Continuing with the example above, a facultymember
with 24 years of service and an $80,000 annual salary, would get a payment
of $24,000 ((.15)(24)(80,000/12)). After federal and state income taxes were
deducted, which we assume would average 23 percent, the faculty member
would have about $16,000 to invest in an annuity.14 However, if he or she
worked onemore year, the university’s retirement contribution for the year,
plus the earnings that would occur on all the assets already in the employee
account, would far exceed the value of the lump sum payment.15 In addi-
tion, working one more year delays the withdrawal of any of the assets for a
year. Not surprisingly, very few eligible statutory faculty enrolled in the de-
fined contribution program participated in the statutory college retirement
incentive program.
Appendix B. Tenure Probabilities, Retirement Ages,
Hiring, and Faculty Salaries at Cornell
This appendix presents some simple steady state models to illustrate how
Cornell’s faculty retirement age influences average faculty salaries, the num-
ber of faculty that we can hire each year, and the annual salary increase avail-
able for continuing faculty. We begin with a baseline model that is meant
to represent endowed Ithaca prior to the abolition of mandatory retire-
ment. We then show how changes in faculty retirement ages influence fac-
ulty members’ salaries and the new hire rate.
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Cornell Confronts the End of Mandatory Retirement 97
The initial model assumes that the university is in a steady state in which it
hires the samenumber of faculty each year, and faculty size remains constant
over time. Salaries in each rank are assumed not to vary with age and each
faculty member in the model receives the current average endowed salary
for his or her rank. Finally, only assistant professors are hired and there is
no turnover other than when people are turned down for tenure or retire.16
The model is then generalized in to allow for salary growth in the full pro-
fessor rank and we illustrate how changes in retirement ages affect Cornell’s
ability to increase continuing faculty salaries. This model is a steady state
model and assumes a uniform distribution of faculty by age, which is not the
situation Cornell actually faces. Consequently, Appendix C presents analy-
ses from amore complex tenure flow simulation approach that permit us to
analyze how endowed Cornell’s actual faculty flows and faculty salaries over
the next twenty years will likely depend on changes in retirement behavior.
A Simple Baseline Model
Suppose the university hires 6 new assistant professors each year who are
30 years old. After 6 years 2/3 (4 of the 6) are promoted to associate pro-
fessor.17 These 4 individuals stay as associate professors for 6 years and then
in turn are all promoted to professor. Professors each work for another 24
years until they all retire at age 66. There is no other turnover or hiring in
this model.
Under these assumptions, at any point in time the university will employ
6 × 6 or 36 assistant professors, 4 × 6 or 24 associate professors and 4 × 24
or 96 full professors.There will be 156 faculty employed and the tenure rate
will be 120/156 or 0.77. Each year the number of new faculty hired, 6, will
represent 3.8 percent of the faculty (6/156). The faculty salary bill is con-
structed by assuming that all faculty in each rank earn the 1996–97 endowed
Ithaca salaries. Thus, the salary bill will be 36 × $50,800, or $1,828,800, 24
× $62,100, or $1,490,400, and 96 × $85,600, or $8,217,600, for a total of
$11,536,800.
In actuality, we note that the current endowed Ithaca faculty size is
roughly 900.Thus one couldmultiply all of the numbers presented above by
roughly 6 if one wanted to scale up to current endowed totals. For simplicity,
we do not do this until the final section.
Changing the Retirement Age
Suppose now that the career of a full professor lasted 29 years rather than
24. Put another way, each faculty member retires at age 71 rather than age
66. Under these assumptions, if we hired 6 new assistant professors each
year, our total faculty would consist of 6 × 6 or 36 assistant professors, 4 × 6
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98 Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Michael W. Matier, and David Fontanella
or 24 associate professors, and 4 × 29 or 116 full professors.This would yield
a total of 176 faculty and a tenure rate of 140/176 or 0.80. This faculty level
is too high, however, since we are assuming that we need 156 faculty to run
the university. Hence, the number of newly hired faculty each year, as well
as the number present at each age, would have to be reduced by 156/176 or
0.886. Put another way, the number of newly hired faculty members each
year would fall to 5.318, a decline of roughly 11 percent from the base sce-
nario.Under this new scenario, we would therefore have 5.318 × 6 or 30.828
assistant professors, 3.546 × 6 or 21.276 associate professors, and 3.546 × 29
or 102.834 full professors, for a total faculty size of 155.938 (which differs
from 156 only because of rounding error).
Our total faculty salary bill in this case would be 30.828 × $50,800 (or
$1,566,062), 21.276 × $62,100 (or $1,321,240), and 102.834 × 85,600 (or
$8,802,590), for a total of $11,689,892.This is $153,092 higher than the total
salary bill in the base scenario. One could get back to that total salary bill
by cutting each faculty member’s salary by $982, or by 1.3 percent. Alterna-
tively, one could cut only full professors’ salaries by an average of $1,489, or
1.7 percent of the average full professor salary level.
Salary Growth for Full Professors
The models presented so far assume that there is no salary growth within
a rank. To illustrate the impact of changes in the retirement age on salary
growth, in this section we relax this assumption for full professors.
The current endowed tenured faculty average salary for individuals in the
age range 40–44 is $71,600. Allowing this to be the starting salary for a 42-
year-old professor and assuming that each full professor receives an annual
‘‘seniority-related’’ salary increase of $1,165, and that each retires at each 66
when his or her salary is $99,600, yields an average full professor salary of
$85,600, which is the current average endowed full professor salary.
Note that in this stylized world, the average percentage salary increase
that each full professor receives each year simply because he or she ages one
year is (1165/85600) × 100 or 1.36 percent. Put another way, even if there
were no general salary pool increase, the average salary increase for full pro-
fessors each year would be 1.36 percent. This occurs because each year fac-
ulty who retire do so at salaries that are $28,000 more than the young full
professors that replace them and this difference is available to distribute to
all other full professors in the form of seniority-related salary increases.18
Now suppose that we increase the retirement age by 5 years to 71. If we
continue to assume that all full professors receive the same seniority-related
increase each year and keep the average full professor salary at $85,600,
the annual increment in salary will fall to 24/29 of $1,165 or $965.50 a year.
As a percentage of the average professor salary, the raise will be 1.12 per-
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
0
.
8
.
1
8
 
1
4
:
0
2
 
O
C
V
:
0
6
1
4
0
 
C
l
a
r
k
/
T
O
R
E
T
I
R
E
O
R
N
O
T
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
1
0
6
o
f
1
8
6
Cornell Confronts the End of Mandatory Retirement 99
cent. Hence, the increase in the retirement age has led to a decline in the
seniority-related increment that professors can receive each year.
Alternatively, suppose that the increment remains at $1,165 a year. In this
case, professors will retire at age 71 at an annual salary of $105,425 and the
average full professor salary will be $88,012.50. Thus, the average costs of
full professors will have risen by 2.8 percent.Unless compensating action is
taken (e.g., fewer faculty or lower salaries for associate or assistant profes-
sors), total faculty costs will have increased above and beyond the baseline
increase.
Extensions
We have shown that, if faculty salaries are assumed to be constant within
rank, an increase in the retirement age of 5 years will lead to about an 11 per-
cent decrease in annual faculty hiring, as well as a 1.3 percent decrease in
the average faculty member’s salary. The model can be generalized to allow
full professors’ salaries to increase with age. Here we found that an increase
in the retirement age of 5 years would reduce the average seniority-related
increase that full professors can receive annually from 1.36 to 1.12 percent.
Are these effects of changes in the mandatory retirement age large enough
to warrant the university’s concern? They assume a constant overall faculty
size and, to the extent that there will be further shrinkage of its faculty size,
hiring will be less in each case. The issue then, is what number of new hires
is needed by the university each year to maintain the intellectual vigor of
the university and to diversify the faculty?
Perhaps one way to address this question is to scale these numbers up to
what the endowed portion of Cornell really looks like. With 900 endowed
faculty rather than 156 in steady state, endowed Cornell would be hiring
roughly 36 new faculty a year in the first scenario. An 11 percent decrease
(the second scenario) would decrease this number to below 32.Whether 32
is sufficiently smaller than 36 is the crux of the concern over whether the
elimination of mandatory retirement should concern the university.
Finally, thismodel assumed all hiring is at the new assistant professor level
and that there is no turnover of faculty save at retirement. To the extent
that tenured faculty members do leave the university prior to retirement,
this leaves open the possibility of hiring some new senior faculty to replace
them.19 If our tenured faculty turnover rate prior to retirement was 2 percent
(0.02) a year, we would have roughly 2.4 (120 × .02) senior faculty vacan-
cies a year in the first scenario. Scaled up to the size of the current endowed
faculty, this would equal roughly fourteen senior vacancies a year. If our
tenured faculty turnover rate prior to retirement were closer to 0.015, the
number of senior vacancies we could fill each year would be closer to 10.8.20
Indeed, staying with the first scenario, our fraction of senior hires would
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be 10.8/43 or 0.16. Historically, Cornell has filled over 30 percent of its en-
dowed faculty positions at the senior level. The model suggests this is too
high a percentage for a steady state.
Appendix C. Simulations Using the Faculty Flow Model
Appendix B reported steady state simulations assuming a uniform distri-
bution of tenured faculty across age groups. It also implicitly assumed that
any tenured faculty member that leaves prior to retirement is replaced by
another tenured faculty member of the same age and salary, and that no
other external tenured appointments are made. Since none of these as-
sumptions is accurate, it is useful to use a faculty flow model developed by
Cornell’s Office of Institutional Planning and Research (IPR) ago to simu-
late what is likely to occur over the next 20 years.21
This faculty flow model divides the faculty into first through seventh year
assistant professors and thirteen age categories of tenured faculty. For each
category, the proportions of people who leave the university, who stay in the
same category, or whomove to each other category each year are calculated
using actual data for the endowed colleges for the October 1994–October
1997 period.22 These ‘‘transition probabilities’’ are initially assumed to re-
main stable in the future.
The average salaries of faculty in each of the 20 categories are calculated
and also are assumed to remain unchanged over time. Put another way, we
ignore general increases in the salary pool that may occur each year. Finally,
when vacancies occur due to departures or retirements, replacements are as-
signed to each of the 20 categories by using the proportion of external hires
that occurred in each of the categories during the last 4 years.This assump-
tion also means that the size of the endowed faculty is assumed to remain
constant at 870 during the period and thus that no further contractions in
faculty size will occur.23
Baseline Scenario
Using the actual numbers of endowed faculty in each of the 20 categories in
1997–98, the various transition probabilities and the distribution of exter-
nal hires across categories, the simulation model is ‘‘run’’ for 20 periods to
take us out to the year 2018.The oldest endowed facultymember is currently
74 years old and some assumptions must be made about the ‘‘continuation
rate’’ for faculty this age and older. It is assumed in these analyses that the
probability of continuing as an active faculty member in the next year is 0.75
for 74-year-olds and that this probability drops to 0.5, 0.25, and 0 during
the next three years. This implies that all faculty will be fully retired from
the university at age 77.
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Panel I of AppendixTable C1 summarizes the results from this simulation.
New faculty hires rise from a predicted 35 in the current year to 47 in 2018
as the ‘‘bulge’’ of professors currently in the 40 to 60 age range begin to re-
tire.The number of faculty age 60 and higher increases for 10 years but then
begins to fall. The percent of endowed Cornell faculty that is tenured falls
gradually from its current level of 83.7 percent to 76.6 percent because of
the relative large number of retirements that eventually occur. After 5 years,
the faculty salary bill begins to decline as the fraction of full professors de-
clines due to retirements. Indeed, 20 years from now, the faculty salary bill
is predicted to be about 1.8 percent lower in constant dollars than it is this
year. The saved funds would be available to redistribute back to faculty in
the form of one-time larger salary increases. If all of the savings were given
to full professors, their salaries would be 2.7 percent higher.
Changing Retirement Rate Parameters of the Model
Panel II of Appendix Table C1 reports the result of simulations in which
a key parameter of the model is changed. The simulations that underlie
panel II assume going forward that all faculty retire no later than age 70.
This is achieved by having all faculty currently older than age 70 retire next
year and changing the retirement probability for faculty age 70 to 1.0 for
future years. Otherwise, all of the other assumptions of the model are as-
sumed to continue to hold.The results show that, if all faculty were to retire
no later than age 70, there would be a big effect on the number of new hires
that could be made initially (as those currently above age 70 retire and are
replaced) but only a smaller long-run effect. Contrasting rows B of panels I
and II, over the 20-year periodwe could hire a total of 959 new faculty rather
than the 881 faculty that would be hired if current retirement practices con-
tinue.This represents an increase in faculty hiring of roughly 9 percent over
the period.This is somewhat less that than the 11 percent change predicted
by the steady state model presented in Appendix B for a 5-year change in
the average retirement age because the change in the average retirement
age being simulated in this appendix is actually smaller than 5 years.
The reduction in retirement ages would have a significant effect on the
faculty salary bill. Five years out, the faculty salary bill would be 1.8 percent
lower under this scenario than under the base scenario (67,267/68,496).
These funds could be redistributed to all continuing faculty in the form of
one-time salary increases. In the longer run (20 years), the differential is
somewhat smaller, but still in the 1.3 percent range.
Appendix Table C2 provides a more detailed summary of the differences
in annual faculty hiring, cumulative faculty hiring, number of faculty age
60+, percent tenured and total faculty salary bill between the two scenarios.
Reducing the retirement age will further reduce the overall tenure rate, but
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102 Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Michael W. Matier, and David Fontanella
the additional reductions that they would lead to are never larger than 2 per-
centage points. The drop due to the changing age structure of the faculty
that Cornell can expect over the next twenty years is considerably larger.
Finally, AppendixTableC3presents estimates of the average annual salary
increase that facultymembers can expect each year as they age, even if there
is no general increase in the salary pool. This is computed by taking all of
the continuing faculty each year, computing the increase for those people
who move between any two categories of faculty each year as the difference
between the average salaries in the two categories, summing these increases
across all faculty, and then dividing by the current average endowed faculty
salary.
These average increases range between roughly 1.0 and 1.2 percent across
years. These numbers are less than the 1.36 percent predicted using the
steady state model Appendix B because that model assumed that fraction
of external faculty hires that occur at the tenure level would be less than
actually has been the case, and that such newly hired tenured faculty would
receive salaries equal to those of the people that they replaced. Often these
newly hired tenured faculty are paid more.
Table C1. Simulations from the Faculty Flow Model for Endowed Ithaca Faculty
1997–98 2002–3 2007–8 2012–13 2017–18
I. Baseline scenario
Number faculty hires 35 40 45 47 47
Cumulative faculty hires 35 190 410 643 881
Number faculty age 60+ 191 236 247 240 225
Percent tenured 83.7 81.3 78.7 77.1 76.6
Faculty salary bill (000s) $68,304 $68,496 $68,022 $67,489 $67,096
II. Induce all faculty to retire
by age 70
Number faculty hires 57 44 48 49 49
Cumulative faculty hires 57 233 469 714 959
Number faculty age 60+ 191 199 207 199 189
Percent tenured 83.7 78.3 77.0 75.9 75.8
Faculty salary bill (000s) $68,304 $67,267 $66,881 $66,462 $66,231
Source: Authors’ calculations using Cornell faculty flow model described in Appendix C.
I: Actual transition probabilities during the last 4 years with assumed continuation rates of .75
for 50- and .25 for 74-, 75-, and 76-year-olds.
II: Same as case I, except all individuals who have not retired by age 70 are assumed to retire
at age 70.
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Table C2. Percentage Differences from the Baseline Scenario
1997–98 2002–3 2007–8 2012–13 2017–18
Number of faculty hires
RRA 62.9 10.0 6.7 4.3 4.3
Cumulative faculty hires
RRA 62.9 22.6 14.4 11.0 8.9
Number faculty age 60+
RRA 0.0 −15.7 −16.2 −18.1 −16.0
Percent tenured (% point difference)
RRA 0.0 −2.0 −1.7 −1.2 −0.8
Faculty salary bill
RRA 0.0 −1.8 −1.7 −1.5 −1.3
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Where: RRA = Reduced Retirement Age.
Table C3. Average Annual Percentage Faculty Salary Increase Due to Normal
Progression Through the System
1997–98 2002–3 2007–8 2012–13 2017–18
Percentage increase 1.08 0.96 1.11 1.14 1.17
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Baseline model save that all faculty are assumed to retire by age 74.
Notes
1. The Cornell University Medical College, located in New York City, has a sepa-
rate retirement program, not discussed here.
2. Interestingly, new faculty hiring rebounded back up to 65 in 1997–98, with new
endowed faculty appointments increasing to 54, the third highest annual level dur-
ing the 1982–83 to 1997–98 period. This spurt of hiring in the endowed colleges
partially reflected an inflow of endowment funds to the university that resulted from
an endowment campaign concluded several years earlier and partially ‘‘prefills’’ in
anticipation of future faculty retirements. The reader should view this increase as a
temporary ‘‘blip,’’ rather than a steady state increase in endowed faculty hiring. Fac-
ulty hiring in the statutory colleges continued to decline through 1997–98 because
of state funding cutbacks described below.
3. Appendix A explains the difference between defined benefit and defined con-
tribution pension plans and elaborates on the points made in this paragraph.
4. Due to funding cutbacks from the State of New York, the number of statutory
tenure-track and tenured faculty fell from 717 in 1988–89 to 631 in 1997–98. It is be-
lieved that many statutory faculty retired during the period to avoid seeing younger
colleagues laid off. Hence, it is difficult to estimate what the impacts of the early
retirement programs, per se, were on statutory faculty retirement behavior.
5. Prior to the elimination of mandatory retirement, Cornell rigorously enforced
its mandatory retirement policies. Retired faculty were nevertheless eligible to be
hired back for specified terms on a part-time basis, at a renegotiated (usually lower)
salary.
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6. A reasonable conjecture is that because the vast majority of statutory faculty
is now enrolled in the TIAA-CREF system, retirement ages will move closer to the
endowed faculty retirement ages over time.
7. More generally, during the 1994–95 to 1996–97 period, universitywide, 80 per-
cent of all faculty who had not retired by age 70 continued on active status the next
academic year.The comparable percentages for faculty turning ages 71 and 72 were
70 percent and 100 percent, respectively.
8. Appendices B and C analyze these two issues using a steady state and a Markov
process faculty flow model, respectively.
9. A copy of this report is available at <www.ipr.cornell.edu/emeritus/transrpt.
html>.
10. The recent retirement incentive plan at the University of California (UC), ana-
lyzed by Switkes (this volume), did induce substantial faculty retirements. However,
the UC faculty were covered by a defined benefit plan and the cost of ‘‘sweetening’’
their benefits was borne by the state retirement system, not the university. For a dis-
cussion of why it is more difficult to ‘‘encourage’’ retirement when faculty are covered
by a defined contribution retirement system rather than a defined benefit system,
see Appendix A.
11. The plan is actually more complicated and allows for less than half-time em-
ployment.
12. The November 1997 final report is available at <www.ipr.cornell.edu/Faculty
to Emeritus/FinalReport.html>.
13. This is a slight simplification of the actual formula. Annual benefits are re-
duced if the faculty member retires before age 65 and also if similar benefits are
guaranteed to the faculty member’s spouse.
14. This was payable in three installments and capped at 45 percent of salary.
15. To see this, note that if the individual’s salary had averaged $60,000 and that if
10 percent had been contributed by the state to his or her retirement account each
year, after twenty-four years, the value of the account (ignoring investment returns)
would be $144,000. If the investment return in this tax-sheltered account were 10
percent in the next year, the earnings of $14,400 would almost equal the value of
the incentive. After one factors in tax-sheltered investment earnings on contribu-
tions to the account over the previous 24 years, as well as the next year’s payment
by the state into the individual’s account of $8,000, one realizes how ineffective this
defined contribution retirement incentive was.
16. We drop these two assumptions in the final section.
17. The actual proportion of newly hired assistant professors during the 1982–83
to 1990–91 period who ultimately were awarded tenure was 63.7 percent.
18. In this model, all new faculty hires still occur at the new assistant professor
level.The ‘‘young full professors’’ who replace retirees are newly promoted associate
professors.
19. If all tenured faculty who leave prior to retirement are replaced by externally-
hired tenured faculty of the same age and salary, none of the other results are altered.
20. The actual number of nonretirement related departures of tenured faculty at
Cornell is quite low. In the endowed colleges, they averaged 11.2 a year over the
1992–93 to 1996–97 period on a base averaging 722 tenured faculty, or 0.016
21. See IPR (1994) for an earlier use of the faculty flow model.
22. Endowed college data are used throughout because, as explained in the text,
funding cutbacks in the statutory colleges coupled with various retirement incen-
tive programs make it difficult for us to compute stable transition probabilities for
statutory faculty.
23. The endowed Cornell actual faculty size exceeds 870 because these analyses
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refer only to tenured and tenure-track faculty who are not on leave in a given year
and are not administrators. The actual number of endowed faculty in 1997–98 was
over 900.
References
Card, David E. and Alan B. Krueger. 1995.Myth and Measurement: The New Economics
of the Minimum Wage. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Lederman, Douglas. 1998. ‘‘Senior-Citizens Group and Colleges Compromise on
Early-Retirement Measure.’’ Chronicle of Higher Education, April 29 (Internet ver-
sion).
National Research Council, Committee on EndingMandatory Retirement inHigher
Education. 1991. Ending Mandatory Retirement for Tenured Faculty: The Consequences
for Higher Education, ed. P. Brett Hammond and Harriet P. Morgan. Washington,
D.C.: National Academy Press.
Neumark, David and William L.Wascher. 1995. ‘‘Reconciling the Evidence on Em-
ployment Effects of MinimumWages: A Review of Our Research Findings.’’ Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics Discussion
Paper 95/53, December.
Office of Institutional Planning andResearch. 1994. ‘‘Uncapping Faculty Retirement
Age.’’ Occasional Report 1, March.
Rees, Albert and Sharon P. Smith. 1991. Faculty Retirement in the Arts and Sciences.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Switkes, Ellen. This volume. ‘‘The University of California Voluntary Early Retire-
ment Incentive Programs.’’
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
0
.
8
.
1
8
 
1
4
:
0
2
 
O
C
V
:
0
6
1
4
0
 
C
l
a
r
k
/
T
O
R
E
T
I
R
E
O
R
N
O
T
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
1
1
3
o
f
1
8
6
